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From Patronage to Policy:
The Centralization Campaign and
Iowa Post Offices, 1890-1915
DANIELE CARPENTER
RURAL LIFE at the dawn of the twentieth century seemed far
removed from the workings of the national government, and in
the main it was. Alexis De Tocqueville remarked that American
government had "no administrative officers of its own, stationed
at fixed points in its territory to whom it can give a common
impulse."' While national politics had a dramatic impact on states
such as Iowa in the nineteenth century, national administration
left little mark. Aside from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's
engagement with experimentation at Iowa Agricultural College^
1. Alexis DeTocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P.
Mayer (Garden City, NY, 1969), part I, chap. 5, p. 90. Tocqueville's characteri-
zation of antebellum America has been much criticized, particularly on its lack
of attention to early postal institutions, which were far more dispersed through-
out the territory in the United States than in France. See Richard John, Spread-
ing the Neivs: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse {Cambridge,
MA, 1995); and Theda Skocpol, "The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement
in American Democracy," Social Science History 21 (1997), 455-79.
I thank the State Historical Society of Iowa for research support and archival
assistance, and the National Archives for assistance. I also acknowledge Sam-
uel Kemell, Michael McDonald, the editor, and four anonymous reviewers for
helpful criticisms that improved the argunrtent. Elements of this research were
presented at the 1998 armual meetings of the American Political Science Asso-
ciation (Boston, MA), the Seminar on Political Institutions at the University
of Michigan, the American Politics Workshop at Princeton University, and
the Organizations and State-Building Workshop of the University of Chicago.
I assume sole responsibility for all interpretations and errors herein.
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and the operations of the General Land Office of the Interior
Department (which by the close of the century had waned con-
siderably), the involvement of officers of the federal government
with Iowans was rare and fleeting. By the end of the century,
moreover, this involvement was declining. The expansion of na-
tional government during Reconstruction was decades past, the
Agriculture Department's sdentific work diminished during
the 1890s, and the one agency most intimately involved with
the West, the Interior Department, had shifted most of its op-
erations farther westward. As Stephen Skowronek has argued,
the national "state" in late nineteenth-century America consisted
not in bureaucracy, but in a network of courts and the hegemony
of parties.^
The national postal system was the clear exception to this
state of affairs. Before 1900, no other federal government agency
was so intricately and materially involved in rural locales as the
Post Office Department. As Richard John has eloquently and
painstakingly narrated in Spreading the News, the Post Office
was the source of profound cultural and political transforma-
tions in the 1800s. Many characteristic elements of nineteenth-
century politics and culture—the cementing of a national mar-
ket for information, the patronage system, the nationalization of
political issues—are simply inconceivable in the absence of a
far-flung postal system the likes of which no other nation had.^
Even in postal operations, however, the law of localism
reigned supreme. The late nineteenth-century Post Office Depart-
ment, while impressive as a network of mail delivery, was little
integrated or centralized as an adrrürústrative organization.'
Some of the reasons for this state of affairs are now well known
among historians. The most compelling is party patronage. The
"spoils" system that characterized national government from
2. R. K. Bliss, A History of Cooperative Agriculture and Home Economics Extension
in Iowa (Ames, 1960); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The
Expansion of National Administrative Capacities (New York, 1981).
3. John, Spreading the News.
4. The Railway Mail Service marked an exception to this lack of integration.
Yet until the RMS was integrated with the postal inspection corps, the integra-
tion and efficiency of the RMS did not materially affect the rest of the depart-
ment's operations. See below.
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1830 onwards decimated the relative efficiencies of Federalist
and Jeffersonian postal policy, and it left the tinge of corruption
and inefficiency upon the federal bureaucracy, to say nothing of
numerous state and local governments also affected by it. In
rural locales postal patronage took a imique form. The domi-
nant patronage figure of rural life was not the machine boss but
the general-store postmaster. The fourth-class postmaster, as
Wayne Fuller describes, was a virtual institution. The office was
often run out of the postmaster's store, and the resulting traffic
in persons gave the postmaster economic security and centrality
in the rural community. Few individuals were more important
to the career of a congressional representative. The result was
local autonomy: fourth-class postmasters had security (and
much leeway) in their jobs as long as their party was in power."*
Beginning in the 1890s, the old regime of postal operations
gradually gave way to a "new regime" as postal executives in
Washington took increasing control of local operations. The
emergence of this new regime was driven in part by the "effi-
ciency" rhetoric of Progressivism, in part by new programs fa-
vored by congressional agrarians, but even more by the organ-
izational control imperatives of the Post Office Department.
Where local autonomy reigned before the 1890s, postal inspec-
tors thereafter began to intrude into every aspect of local opera-
tions. Where postal spending and accounting were highly de-
centralized before 1900, the department stepped in to rein in
costs and standardize accounts. This transformation is particu-
larly evident in Iowa. One of the strongest states in the post-
Reconstruction Republican stronghold, Iowa was home to the
quintessence of the patronage system: numerous small-scale
post offices of the first, second, and third classes, with firmly
entrenched incumbent postmasters, as well hundreds of fourth-
class post offices dotting the countryside. Iowa also stands as a
chief example of the department's reform efforts. After 1890, few
states made the transition from patronage to policy as quickly.
Another legacy of postal change—one centrally tied to the
culture of rationalization—was the eclipse of women's manage-
5. Wayne Fuller, RFD: The Changing Pace of Rural America (Bloomington, IN,
1964).
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rial roles. A forgotten aspect of patronage is that it saw women
in numerous positioris of workplace authority and discretion,
sometimes in the position of postmaster itself. As postal cen-
tralization gained ground, women were increasingly relegated
to clerical work. The consequences of postal reform provide a
vivid example of the "clericalization" of women's work in the
Progressive Era.*
THE YEAR 1883 was a banner year in government admin-
istration. Congress passed the Pendleton Act, a measure that
legally buried the spoils system/ Yet that same year the Post
Office witnessed its last operations surplus for three decades.
In 1883 the post office accounts stood over $2 million in the
black. A year later they were almost $4 million in the red, or 9
percent of revenues. In 1885 the deficit ballooned to $7.4 million,
or 17 cents on every dollar of revenues. While congressional
policy often encouraged fiscal profiigacy with numerous expan-
sior\s of free delivery service, the deficits of the 1880s and 1890s
brought ringing criticism upon the department for its surfeit of
offices, its inefficient workers, and its dated methods. For the
Gilded Age Post Office, the legacy of patronage was a reputa-
tion for sloth.^
In the 1890s, more than at any time since John McLean's
term as Postmaster General in the 1820s, Post Office officials
cared deeply about the reputation of their agency. After 1860 a
new reform-minded cadre of postal officials arose, chiefly from
6. Margary Davis, A YJoman's Place Is at the Typewriter: Office and Office Workers,
1870-1930 (Philadelphia, 1982); Elyce J. Rotella, From Home to Office: U.S.
Women at Work, 1870-1930 (Ann Arbor, MI, 1981); Carole Srole, "A Position
That God Has Not Particularly Assigned to Men: The Feminization of Clerical
Work, Boston, 1860-1915" (Ph.D. diss.. University of California, Los Angeles,
1984); Angel Kwolek-FoUand, Engendering Business: Men and Women in the Cor-
porate Office, 1870-1930 (Baltimore, 1994).
7. The burial of spoils in practice would come incrementally by the decisions
of successive presidents to "cover in" certain departments and classa of
workers under the Pendleton law.
8. See Postmaster General, Annual Reports, 1890-1912. For a more thorough
review of the department's weak reputation during this period, see Daniel P.
Carpenter, "The Waning of the Old Postal Regime, 1862-1894," book chapter
manuscript. University of Michigan.
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the ranks of the department's cohesive and insular Railway
Mail Service. These reformers aimed to expand the depart-
ment's role in American political economy, by moving into new
areas of communication and transportation, by reshaping the
Post Office Department into a machine-like enterprise, even by
using the department's powers to regulate American sexuality.
The new regime included postal inspector Anthony Comstock,
attorney James Tyner, railway superintendent James White, re-
former August Machen and Postmaster General John Wana-
maker. The reform wing was ideologically cohesive. Republican
(yet distrustful of the party's old guard), and bent upon the
obliteration of the old Jacksonian way of doing things.^
The primary strategy of the reformers was to increase the
presence of ir\spectors in everyday operations. Comstockery—
the late nineteenth-century anti-pornography movement cen-
tered in the post office and civic "vice suppression societies"—
fueled the increase of inspectors, but postal executives detailed
most of them not to "anti-adulteration" work, but to the moni-
toring of local offices. The national inspection force had been
stagnant for most of the century, even with the proliferation of
offices and mail routes, yet quintupled from just over 20 during
Reconstruction to 100 by 1897. From 1897 to 1910 the inspection
force tripled, reaching more than 300 inspectors by Taft's in-
auguration. Crucially, the postal inspection force and the chief
inspector were placed not under the assistant postmasters gen-
eral, but under the postmaster general himself. Still, the in-
spectors took guidance from the first and second assistant post-
masters general (in charge of city delivery and transportation
policy, respectively). Under guidance from postal executives
such as First Assistants Perry S. Heath and Frank Hitchcock,
9. On the evolution of the Railway Mail Service, see Daniel P. Carpenter, "The
Corporate Metaphor and Executive Department Centralization in the United
States, 1880-1920," Studies in American Political Development 12 (1998), 162-203.
On the emergence of a reform wing in the Post Office Department, see idem,
"State-Building through Organizational Renewal: Reputation and Program
Expansion in National Postal Administration, 1883-19Í3," paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1998. The
most thorough portrait of the department in the 1890s appears in Marshall
Cushing, The Story of Our Post Office: The Greatest Government Department in All
Its Pilases (Boston, 1893).
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Second Assistants J. Louis Ball and G. E Stone and others, in-
spectors delved into the "reliability" and "regularity" of all
manner of local operations, including postmasters' accounts,
their quarterly reports, contract bidding, and star route service.'"
The impetus for reform (and for lowering the deficit) crested
in the early 1890s, when Postmaster General John Wanamaker
proposed an ambitious new set of policies, including govern-
ment operation of the telegraph, a parcel post, a rural free deliv-
ery system, and seven other wide-ranging reforms. Yet with the
postal deficit at over 10 percent of revenues. Congress balked.
Members of Congress and the press cited the department's deficit
as an obstacle to any expansion of the postal mandate." Through-
out this period, postal reformers understood that improving the
department's fiscal balance was a necessary condition for the
satisfaction of their designs.
10. Wayne Fuller, The American Mail (Chicago, 1972), 273-77; Cushing, The Story
of Our Post Office, 617. For a thorough archive of the guidance given to special
agents by Washington officials, see Office of the Second Assistant Postnnaster
General, "Letters Sent To Special Agents, 1894-1904," National Archives (here-
after NA), Record Group (RG) 28 (Records of the Post Office Department),
Entry (E) 102. On "reliability" in contract bidding, see W. S. Shallenberger
[Second Assistant Postmaster General] to Irvin W. Mayfield, 10 January 1903,
NA, RG 28, E 102, box 1, vol. 1, p. 6. On "reliability" in postmasters' reports, see
Shallenberger to W. C. Heckman, asst. supt. RMS, 9 February 1903, ibid., p. 90.
11. When Wanamaker floated the rural free delivery idea in the early 1890s,
many newspapers doubted the very possibility of a fiscally balanced postal
program. Admitted the otherwise enthusiastic editor of the Steubenville (Ohio)
Star, "the Goverrunent Post-Office, it is true, is far from being self-sustaining."
For editorial concern about the postal deficit, see Wanamaker's voluminous
report, "Free Delivery System," 3 May 1892, Senate Exec. Doc. No. 92, 52d
Cong., 1st sess., 173 (also 123). Even 15 years later when the department had
reduced the deficit to 5 percent of revenues, opponents of its favored program
—parcel post delivery—still pressed deficit concerns. The Chicago Dry-Goods
Reporter warned of "the enormous annual deficit which the parcels business
cannot fail to create in the postal department." Chicago Dry-Goods Reporter, 26
February and 3 March 1900. Charles William Burrows, the most eloquent of
parcel post's detractors, pointed to program losses in the special delivery
service, money orders, and early rural delivery and claimed that "the service is
blow-holed, full of inaccuracy and fraud upon which there is no efficient
check." Charles William Burrows "Thoughts Upon Some Proposed Parcels
Post Legislation," an address delivered at the Union Club, Cleveland, 30 Octo-
ber 1906, pp. 1, 12, Firestone Library, Princeton University. See also the peti-
tions of Hills, Minnesota, and Pana, Illinois, in House Committee Files, "Parcel
Post," NAI, RG 233, HR56A-H21.9.
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FIGLfRE 1
The Advance of Postal Inspection in Iowa, 1898-1909
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Iowa also witnessed a burgeoning and more aggressive force
of postal inspectors. Inspectors for the Iowa post offices were
based in headquarters in Chicago, managed from 1889 onwards
by Chief Inspector James E. Stuart. Stuart had four decades of
experience in the department and had served in the Railway
Mail Service with its founder, George Armstrong. From 1898 to
1909 the number of inspectors based in Chicago quadrupled,
from 15 to 59. Whereas orüy four inspectors were explicitly de-
tailed to Iowa operations in 1898, by 1909 14 individuals moni-
tored Iowa operatioris, and many more regulated Rural Free
Delivery (see fig. 1). Most of Iowa's inspectors, unlike those in
most other states, were highly experienced. Besides James
Stuart's three decades of service, C. E. Stewart headed the Iowa
force throughout the expansion period. Stewart took over in
1898 and remained at least until 1911, when available personnel
rosters end.'^
12. A discussion of rural free delivery appears below. None of the inspectors in
the statistical samples here were rural special agents (who inspected rural free
delivery service). Rural agents were not joined with the regular postal inspec-
tion force until December 1905, and even then they were kept separate from
the other agents. See "Order of the Postmaster General" [George Cortelyou],
Order No. 448, 1 November 1905, copy in Haugen Papers, box 93, booklet
marked "Post Office #1," State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City. On
Stuart's experience under Armstrong, see "Recollections of M. J. McGrath,
Superintendent of Free Delivery, Chicago Post Office," in George Armstrong
Collection, Chicago Historical Society. Armstrong's claim to have originated
the service was later challenged in William A. Davis, The Railway Postal Service:
Originated by William A. Davis of St. Joseph, Missouri (Washington, DC, 1888).
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Iowa inspectors stood out in one other respect. A high pro-
portion of the Iowa inspectors was drawn from the ranks of the
Railway Mail Service (RMS), the organizational base of the postal
reform wing. Its members detested the inefficiency, congres-
sional favor, and facile work that, in their view, characterized
most postmasters. As a result, postal inspectors trained in the
Railway Mail Service aggressively pursued malfeasance in local
offices. In 1898, 47 percent of Chicago-based inspectors, includ-
ing C. E. Stewart, the leader of the Iowa force, had been hired
directly from the RMS."
At the turn of the century, then, names such as C. E. Stewart,
Harry Hadsel, James T. Boylan, Alex Charles, John Mahin, and
others were an ever more common presence in Iowa post of-
fices. Moreover, through the inspectors' actions, the presence of
executives in Washington and Chicago such as Frank Hitchcock,
J. Louis Ball, G. F Stone, and James Stuart was also enhanced.
The days of administrative solitude were over.
THE NEW REGIME had the effect of relentlessly standard-
izing numerous aspects of postal operations in Iowa and else-
where. In the 1870s and 1880s, accounts in most offices were
written in whatever form the postmaster wished to record them
even though formal account books existed for their use. In the
1880s, money order books for George M. Howlett, postmaster of
the Cedar Rapids office, contained a summary page for each
business day, whereas the books for Postmaster J. T Urice of
Garrison (a fourth-class office) included a separate entry for
each individual order. The only common feature of both offices'
13. On the organizational ideology of the RMS, see Carpenter, "The Corporate
Metaphor and Executive Department Centralization"; and idem, "State Build-
ing through Organizational Renewal." Inspectors' information drawn from
National Archives inspectors rosters, "Rosters 1898-1909," which contain per-
sonnel information to 1911, NA, RG 28, E 234. The fraction of inspectors who
spent at least part of their previous careers in the RMS (including those who
were not hired directly from the service) is higher, but unavailable in existing
records. Because the National Archives data code only the service from which
the inspector was hired, they exclude inspectors who were trained in the RMS
yet who also worked for another division of the department before being hired
into the inspectors' corps. Hence the reported fractions are a lower limit on the
percentage of inspectors who were trained in the RMS.
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records is the loose scribble in which they were kept, many
entries being illegible to any eyes but the postmaster's. Such
disparities across offices were a primary target of the inspectors,
as is evident from a remark made in the early 1890s by Marshall
Cushing, secretary to Postmaster General John Wanamaker:
"The great bulk of an inspector's work consists of investigations
of simple irregularities in the mail service. The fourth class post-
masters do not carefully observe the rules and regulations, and
hence much carelessness, where there is no dishonesty, results."'*
After the department issued a new set of regulations in 1893,
however, miiform accounting procedures quickly took hold in
the nation's post offices. Postmasters no longer jotted down
receipts according to their discretion or personal organizational
style. Instead, they completed the standard account forms that
Washington had been issuing for years. Cash books and account
books from Cedar Rapids and Garrison in the late 1890s and
early 1900s appear utterly imlike those of the 1880s. The depart-
ment also targeted postmarking. Accurate postmarking was es-
sential for inspectors who sought stolen mail or fraudulent busi-
nesses. In 1897 First Assistant Postmaster Perry Heath issued a
circular that standardized the practice. Heath's circular warned
that the Post Office was "determined to secure a radical reform
in the method of postmarking," demor\strating the reformers'
commitment to overhauling the most minute operations.'^
In first- and second-class offices—those in larger cities and
towr\s such as Cedar Rapids, Iowa City, and Oskaloosa—many
other practices and activities were standardized. Among the
14. Cash Book, George M. Howlett, Postmaster, Cedar Rapids, 1870 and 1881,
Records of the Cedar Rapids Post Office, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa
City (hereafter SHSI); Cash Book, 1887-1888, J. T Urice, Poshnaster, Garrison,
Records of the Garrison Post Office, SHSI; Cushing, The Story of Our Post Office,
313. Formal account books existed from the 1830s and were widely used for
reporting to Washington, but supplemental account books kept at local post
offices varied more widely in use. I thank an anonymous reviewer for clarify-
ing this point.
15. For standardized forms, see Accounts and Records, Cedar Rapids Post Of-
fice, 1898-1900; Account and Record Book, Cedar Rapids Post Office, 1916; and
Cash Book, Cedar Rapids Post Office, 1916-17, in Records of the Cedar Rapids
Post Office, SHSI; Perry Heath, "Official Instructions in Relation to Postmark-
ing and Backstamping," Washington, D.C, 14 May 1897, ibid.; Cushing, 77K
Story of Our Post Office, 432£f.
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most important concerned residential and business deliveries
under the free delivery service. In the early 1890s Iowa post
offices varied widely in the frequency of their delivery patterns.
Council Bluffs offered two residential deliveries per day in 1896,
while Muscatine and Fort Madison offered one, Iowa City four,
and Oskaloosa five. These patterns were not directly related to
the cities' size or business activity, for Davenport and Dubuque,
each several times larger than Oskaloosa, had two residential
deliveries per day to Oskaloosa's five. A similarly wide variance
accompanied the cities' business delivery practices, where the
frequency of carriage in 1897 ranged from five per day in Iowa
City to twice in Muscatine. By 1910, this scattered state of
individual office operations had largely disappeared. Most of
Iowa's first- and second-class offices operated much as Cedar
Rapids, where Postmaster W. G. Haskell described his daily
operations in 1911 as follows:
Cedar Rapids has Üiirty incoming and thirty-eight outgoing mails
daily. Four deliveries of mail in the business districts and two in
the residence districts are made daily {except Sianday); one deliv-
ery each day (except Sunday) over all rural routes. Four daily foot
collections and two moimted collections are made in the business
districts and two in the residence districts (except Sunday).'*
By the time of Haskell's report, Iowa's larger post offices
had converged to near uniformity in the frequency of deliveries
(see table 1). Whereas just over half of Iowa post offices
delivered to businesses three or four times daily in 1896, fully 86
percent of offices made three or four daily deliveries by 1910.
The standardization was even more pronounced in residential
deliveries. Whereas four in ten offices delivered twice per day
to residences in 1896, every one of Iowa's 36 first- and second-
class offices settled on two daily residential deliveries by 1910.''
As in delivery patterns, so with uniforms. Although uni-
forms had been worn in eastern cities since the 1860s, their use
was not standardized, and they were rarely seen in western and
16. "United States Post Office, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, with Compliments of W. G.
Haskell, Postmaster" (1911), p. 7, Reconds of Cedar Rapids Post Office.
17. See Post Office Department siirvey of first- and second-dass offices, 1896-
1910,NAI,RG28,E95.
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TABLE 1
THE STANDARDIZATION OF DELIVERY PATTERNS FOR
FIRST- AND SECOND-CLASS POST OFFICES IN IOWA, 1896-1910
Year
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
Percentage of
offices with
TWO
daily residential
deliveries
42
50
79
83
87
88
85
86
86
86
89
89
92
92
100
Percentage of
offices with
THREE
daily business
deliveries
25
29
57
45
4D
44
39
35
38
44
44
44
53
53
50
SOURCE: Sample of 36 first- and second-class
chives survey. Record Group 28, Entry 95.
Percentage of
offices with
FOUR
daily business
deliveries
29
38
21
34
43
28
27
31
33
31
31
33
28
31
36
post offices in Iowa,
Percentage of
offices with
THREE or FOUR
daily business
deliveries
54
67
79
79
83
72
67
66
72
75
75
78
81
83
86
ftom National Ar-
southern towns. The department promulgated regulations in
1894 encouraging carriers to wear uniforms. Carriers lamented
their "heavy blue helmets" during humid summers. In Cedar
Rapids, the office adopted a gray uniform with wide-brimmed
hats and dark neckties, prompting a local newspaper to joke
that the carriers looked "just a little like confederate generals
fresh from the battlefield at Gettysburg." The helmets gave way
to lighter hats, but the uniforms remained.'^
18. See the recollections of New Orleans mail carrier Ozenine Kinler in "Oldest
Postman Still Spry After 41 Years' Service," Times-Picayune, 15 November 1925,
Louisiana Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University. A
1907 portrait of letter carriers in their new uniforms appears in the Cedar Rap-
ids Gazette, 5 April 1959 (see ill.). See also Postmaster W. G. Haskell, United
States Post Office, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Both in Cedar Rapids Post Office Files.
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Des Moines postal carriers pose in Hxeir mismatched uniforms in 1896.
The Post Office Department expected carriers to be "neat and tidy in thär
dress while officially employed in order that they bring no disgrace upon
the service with which they are connected" (quoted in Fuller, RFD, 108-9).
Photo courtesy State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City (SHSI).
Department executives also standardized work hours. Be-
fore 1900, the department did not regulate postal workers' hours,
and postmasters were known to leave the management of their
offices to their clerks and assistants for days at a time. With the
growth of inspection, Washington executives used carrots as well
as sticks to establish broad expectations that all postal employees
put in a mirümum eight-hour workday. When the postmaster at
West Urüon wrote to Washington requesting authority and fund-
ing to hire a part-time auxiliary clerk to assist him with a new
village delivery program, the department wrote to Fifth District
Representative Gilbert N. Haugen stating the conditions that
would have to be met in order to obtain additional resources for
the West Urüon office. "The Chief Clerk," the officer wrote to
Haugen, "tells me that he is willing to give him four or five hours
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A decade after the photograph on the facing page waa itiKcn, K^edar Rapids
postal carriers posed in the standardized uniforms. Photo courtesy SHSÍ.
auxiliary clerk hire, if needed, in addition to himself, assistant
and one clerk, which he now has, and also establish village de-
livery, as the Department does not want P.M.'s to work eleven
hours, although they expect them to do a little more than eight."
The Chief Clerk's expectation was clear: the job of postmaster
was now a "full time occupation.""
West Union eventually secured village delivery, but not until
other conditions were met. Free delivery service was neither a
birthright nor a foregone conclusion for any town at the turn of
the century. The postmaster had to meet "civic requirements"
defined by the department: a rational mapping and numbering
of the town's streets, placing of receptacles for the mail, and so
on. As correspondence in the files of Representative Gilbert
Haugen shows, no amount of pressure from local elites and
legislators could overcome the department's insistence that it
would grant free delivery service only where the postmaster
19. Untitled letter (apparently to Haugen) from Department, no date (but
probably 1906 and no later than 1910), Haugen Papers, box 99.
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had estahlished an infrastructure for it. The postmaster could
officially establish free delivery, hut the department would not
provide the needed funds and supplies (free delivery envelopes
and cards) unless its demands were met. West Union and other
offices received additional supplies, additional workers, and ad-
ditional services only if they could clearly demonstrate the need
and the capacity to postal headquarters. What is more, the in-
spectors' report allowed the department to closely track post-
masters' compliance with their demands. Cases such as West
Uruon illustrated the new ways Washington administrators and
department inspectors used their power after 1900.
CENTRALIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION were im-
portant developments in their own right, but they had an ii\stru-
mental purpose as well: reducing operating costs and improving
the department's bottom line. In part because information about
dty post offices was so elusive in the nineteenth century, the Post
Office began in 1896 to track their procedures in a multiyear sur-
vey The survey traced costs and revenues, the population served
and square miles covered in the delivery program, the number of
letter boxes, the number of deliveries and collections per week,
expenditures for stock, and the average yearly hours worked by
postal carriers. The very execution of the survey, as well as the
richness of its data, evince the growing inclination of Washington
offidals to scrutinize local operations.
Department reformers in Washington were most interested in
service costs. Without cost reductions, postal offidals knew that
the system's defidt would continue to represent an insurmount-
able obstade to their policy designs. Even more sigrüficantly,
costs represented the core conflict in the tum-of-the-century Post
Office: central control versus local autonomy. When delivery
costs rose steadily, as during the free delivery expansions of the
1880s, autonomy flourished. Higher costs, as a percentage of
business volume, meant free spending patterns made possible
by the allegiance of postmasters to local elites and Congress.
20. Data from the department's survey reside in the National Archives, and
include all post offices of the ñrst and second class in Iowa, or 36 offices during
the period 1896-1910.
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FIGURE 2
Cost Reduction in Iowa Post Offices, 1896-1910
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The cost of free delivery declined steadily in larger Iowa
post offices at the tum of the century (see fig. 2). On average,
delivery costs as a percentage of revenues dropped from 23 per-
cent in 1896 to 19 percent in 1910, a 21 percent improvement.
The low cost margins might suggest a surplus, but the depart-
ment's office statistics hid general system costs. Cross-country
transport required enormous payments to railroad comparées
as well as m^aintenance of an elaborate network of railway
service lines, stagecoaches, and administrative offices, none of
which earned revenue but all of which were crucial to the free
delivery system. Nonetheless, Iowa post offices returned four
cents more per dollar to the department in 1910 than in 1896.^ '
21. National postal statisHcs show that the decline in the postal deficit—from
13.1 percent of revenues in 1897 to 2.3 percent of revenues in 1910—was al-
most certainly driven by increased efficiency in dty free delivery. The answer
surely cannot lie in Rural Free Delivery, which only increased costs after it be-
gan in 1896 (though it did not really begin on a large scale until 1902). Al-
though RFD did boost postal revenues, revenue growth cannot account for the
department's improved fiscal state after 1896. Real revenue growth during the
period of deficit expansion (1883-1896) was 8.6 percent, almost double revenue
growth of 4.6 percent when the deficit was shrinking (1897-1910). The key to
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The department's aims were achieved, then, but were other
factors at work? Is there evidence, furthermore, to suggest that
the expansion of inspectors was a key factor? Although definitive
evidence of the "cause" of the decline is impossible to adduce,
the department's survey does allow an examination of Öiis ques-
tion through a statistical lens. The survey includes a number of
variables, including local population, the extent of services
(such as the square miles covered in the delivery network, as
well as the frequency of collections and deliveries). The survey
also measured carriers' office time and total time, both of which
suggest the ability of local offices to get their workers to put in
more hours.
It is also possible to control for political factors by merging
census and voting data into the survey. Partisan strategy
strongly affected the operations of post offices even after the
end of patronage. Even though first- and second-class carriers
were "covered in" by 1894, their bosses were not. City post-
masters had impressive political leverage at their disposal. They
could employ carriers to canvass for the party, press for greater
hiring of clerks and carriers during election years, and use the
power of contracting to spend more in areas where the party
most needed an infusion of pork. Accordingly the statistical
analyses include two important political variables: the percent-
age of the popular vote for the Republican congressional candi-
date in the most recent election and the percentage turnout.
Finally, to assess whether the department's inspection efforts
were successful, the analyses include aggregates from National
Archives data on all inspectors overseeing postal operations in
Iowa, including the percentage of inspectors overseeing an office
who were promoted from the RMS.
A "regression" analysis of these unique data shows that sev-
eral variables had a pronounced effect on costs during this period
the department's fiscal health was a robust reduction in spending growth, from
a 9.7 percent annual increase over the 1883-1896 period to only 3.9 percent
annUíílly during the 1897-1910 period. While the department's reduced pay-
ments to railroads undoubtedly helped, the largest expenditure declines were
in the 75 percent reduction in annual spending increases. See Daniel Roper,
"Statistics of the Postal Service from 1862 to 1910," in Postal Poliaes and Prob-
lems (Washington, DC, 1913); also in Burleson Papers, Library of Congress.
Iowa Post Offices 289
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM REGRESSION ANALYSIS
OF FREE DELIVERY COSTS IN 36 IOWA POST OFFICES, 1896-1910
Variable
Daily business deliveries
Daily residential collec-
tions
Carriers' tota! time
County vote for Repub-
lican candidate in pre-
vious congressional
election
County-level electoral
turnout
Percentage of Iowa
postal inspectors trained
in the Railway Mail
Service
Average cost savings
(1900 dollars) from a one-
unit shift in variable
$151.55
(one less daily delivery)
$137.89
(one less daily collection)
$498.45
(additional hour per day)
$21.01
(one additional
percentage point)
$25.20
(one less percentage point)
$92.98
(one additional
percentage point)
Total cost savings
(1900 dollars) as-
sociated with vari-
able, 1896-1910
$26,700
$36,800
$29,700
$2,500
$154,000
$550,000
SOURCE National Archives survey. Record Group 28, Entry 95.
NOTE: Number of observafions (office-years): 440. Percentage of variance in costs ex-
plained by statistical model: 97 percent.
(see table 2). The department's efforts to increase working hours
probably contributed to an increase in efficiency. Because postal
workers were not paid by hourly wage but were salaried, and
because there was no mandatory eight-hour work day, when
workers put in more hours, there was less need to hire addi-
tional salaried persormel or contract out office functions. Thus,
an additional hour of carriers' work over a 10-day period re-
duced costs by $500.^ The most important factor reducing free
delivery costs, however, was the percentage of ir\spectors over-
seeing the office who were trained in the RMS. Every percentage-
22. The average carrier worked ten minutes more in 1910 than in 1896, so this
effect is less than it may seem.
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point increase in this index was associated with a drop of $93 in
annual costs per office. Apparently, then, inspection was having
a cost-depressing effect on operations in Iowa and elsewhere.
Finally, post offices in Iowa and elsewhere may have spent less
money on free delivery as the patronage system waned. As turn-
out declined after the 1890s—from 89.5% in some Iowa counties
in 1896 to 75.6% by 1910—politidans' incentive to take advantage
of free delivery for partisan purposes also dropped, £ind so did
costs.
Two caveats merit discussion here. First, the period from
1896 to 1910 also witnessed the launching of Rural Free Delivery
(RFD). Could RFD have led to these cost reductions? Although
RFD sponsored its own efficiencies—particularly the closure of
hundreds of fourth-class offices (see below)—the deficit and
cost reductions of 1896 to 1910 are little if at all related to the
program. Rural Free Delivery did not commence on a large scale
in Iowa imtil 1901 and was not made statutory by Congress
until 1902. By that time the department's costs and deficit had
been dropping for six years. Moreover, while the RFD service
hired its own special agents, they were not unified with the
general inspectors' corps until 1905."
Another caveat is interpretive. It would be wrong to attrib-
ute the advance of inspection and the reduction in postal spend-
ing to the inspectors' irútiative alone. Indeed, most of the credit
for the cost reduction belongs to the Washington and Chicago
officials—Heath, Wanamaker, Chief Inspector M. D. Wheeler,
Tyner, Stuart, and others—^who sent the inspectors into the field
and who drove them to enforce the rules.
23. Many scholars date the origins of the rural free delivery program to 1896,
but this attribution is inaccurate for two reasons. First, Postmaster General
Wanamaker commenced more than 40 experimental Rural Free Delivery routes
in 1891, routes that were discontinued in 1894 for lack of congressional appro-
priations. Second, the 1896 RFD routes merely reopened the earlier experi-
ments. It was not until the fantastically successful Carroll County (Maryland)
experimente of 1899-1900 and a subsequent petition drive (invited by the de-
partment) that Rural Free Delivery got off the ground. See Carpenter, "State
Building through Organizational Renewal." It is also worth noting that RFD
ran at a slight loss for the first several years of its operation, at least on the na-
tional level.
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THE ADVANCE OF INSPECTION and the standardization
of hours and other practices may have helped the Post Office
Department to render new economies from Iowa post offices.
Yet the most dramatic change in Iowa postal operations after
1896 was not in the larger first- and second-class post offices,
but in the fourth-class offices—small offices serving rural areas.
Iowa was home to many of the earliest experimental services in
Rural Free Delivery (RFD), the legendary program that prom-
ised to bring mail directly to farmers. The legacy of RFD was
not simply a new service. Rural Free Delivery was also an in-
strument by which the postal reform wing attempted to reduce
the numbers and the autonomy of fourth-class postmasters.
That effort, the evidence from Iowa suggests, was far more suc-
cessful than has been supposed.
Before 1900, farmers traveled miles, often a full day's travel,
to retrieve their mail. In 1891, Postmaster General Wanamaker
proposed a radical expansion of free delivery service to small
towns. Congress harbored doubts about the fiscal promise of the
program, but when the department showed repeated fiscal and
admirüstrative success in its RFD experiments, previously reluc-
tant legislators, under pressure from rural constituents, signed
on to the program. With support from agrarian legislators,
RFD quickly proliferated throughout the American countryside,
reaching more than 30,000 communities by the First World War."
The pace of RFD expansion was particularly rapid in Iowa.
Thanks to the infiuence of Third District Representative David B.
Henderson—a member of the House Post Office Committee in
the 1890s and later Speaker of the House—Iowa received a large
share of the first experimental RFD routes. In Iowa as else-
where, however. Rural Free Delivery carried a mixed institu-
tional legacy As Roy Atwood has argued in his study of RFD in
southeastern Iowa, fanners greeted rural delivery with enthu-
siasm at first but quickly realized its "cultural contradictions."
The program boosted the promptness and quantity of rural mail
and made increased communications possible, hut it also brought
the products of corporate enterprise to the farm, squeezing out
24. See Fuller, RFD, passim; Fuller, "Rural Free Delivery in Hardin County,
Iowa," Annals of Iowa 41 (1973), 1049-72, esp. 1049-54.
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local stores and craftwork enterprises, to say nothing of the
weekly town newspaper.^
The institufional parameters of Rural Free Delivery left enor-
mous discretion in the hands of the Post Office Department. Its
experiments under RFD Superintendent August Machen had
evinced a newfound capacity for management. At the same
time. Congress was largely unable to either micromanage or pro-
cedurally regiilate the administrative expansion of the system.
Thus, the department assumed control of virtually every aspect
of rural operations; the selection and mapping of routes, the
recruitment of carriers, and, most critically, the terminafion of
fourth-class post offices.^ ^
The organization of the Rural Free Delivery Service con-
sciously reflected the signal traits of the Railway Mail Service.
Machen and Perry Heath established a set of eight geographic
divisions for the RFD Service, creating regional superintendents
as in the RMS. These divisions were responsible for establishing
thousands of routes per year. An even more significant reflection
of the new postal regime was the RFD's reliance on railway-
trained inspectors. All new routes had to be approved by the de-
partment; members of Congress could not simply legislate routes
into existence as in the case of private bills or works projects.
Because the demand for routes outstripped supply, the depart-
ment had to choose which communities deserved routes and
w^hich did not. Doing so required information on the economic
feasibility of routes in commurüties about which few in Wash-
ington had knowledge. Accordingly, department procedures
gave the decisive role in this choice process to the RFD special
agents, who after 1905 were made regular postal inspectors.
25. Roy Alden Atwood, "Routes of Rural Discontent: Cultural Contradictions
of Rural Free Delivery in Southeastern Iowa, 1899-1917," Annals of Iowa 48
(1980), 264-73. Of course, many farmers welcomed the lower prices and
broader array of products available through RFD, especially after RFD carriers
were officially allowed to transport parcels after 1912,
26. There were occasional exceptions to the department's authority over Ser-
vice design. Rural legislators resisted the department's attempts to standardize
mailbox specifications. Fuller, RFD, 46-47. Iristead, the department was allowed
to grant authority to 14 comparées to produce mailboxes according to POD
specifications, an authority that required companies to include the common
imprimatur, "Approved by the Postmaster General."
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The first step in obtaining a new route was a casual appli-
cation from an individual or postmaster, supported by a peti-
tion signed by 150 families on the proposed route. The depart-
ment then referred the route decision to the Division of the
Chief Inspector. The division assigned an inspector to visit the
route, map it, report on any existing star routes (where contrac-
tors on horseback carried the mail), and recommend for or
against establishing a route. Rural agents (or inspectors) had
nearly total discretion in route selection and management. If
the special agent recommended against a route, it was nearly
impossible for a community to obtain one, even where its con-
gressman strongly favored it. Agents also had the authority to
alter routes, and if they suggested discontinuance the depart-
ment almost always followed suit.^ ^
At the community level, a triangular flow of information
developed among the RFD inspector, the congressional repre-
sentative and department officials. A rich portrait of the rela-
tions among these three actors emerges from the papers of Gil-
bert N. Haugen, the Republican representative of Iowa's Fifth
District in northeast Iowa from 1900 to 1928. The agents assigned
to the post offices in Haugen's district were Gilbert Guttersen
and George Olson. Guttersen and Olson repeatedly sought
Haugen's recommendations and suggestions for the manage-
27. See Preliminary Report of the ¡oint Commission on the Business Method of the
Post Office Department and tlie Postal Service, Senate Reports, 60th Cong., 1st
sess., vol. 4 (2 December 1907-30 May 1908), p. 39. Examples abound of rural
agents defying Congress in the belief that they held local power. A case in
Georgia is illustrative. Despite objections from Senator Alexander S. Clay to
some route changes planned by a Rural Free Delivery agent there, the route
alterations nonetheless went through. Clay was concerned that the department
was exerting too little control over the agent, who "thinks he is the Post Office
Department." The department had granted this authority to its rural agents in
part because it was so informationally dependent upon them. As Fuller de-
scribes them, "Politicians though many of the rural agents were, one can
hardly imagine how the fanners' mail system could have been organized
without them. For they were the eyes and ears of the Department as they trav-
eled country roads laying out new routes and checking old ones. They built up
a wealth of information about rural delivery that was indispensable to the
postal officials in Washington. Regulation after regulation based on the agents'
reports and designed to take the kinks out of the service went out from the
department, until in a surprisingly short time the farmers were receiving their
mail every day on the hour with scarcely a mishap." Fuller, RFD, 45-46.
294 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
ment of Fifth District operatior\s. Both Olson and Guttersen
went to lengths to let Haugen offer his opinion before ad-
vancing their recommendatior\s to the department. The agents
sought Haugen's support for their decisior\s, knowing it would
strengthen their hand in Washington. Guttersen became a close
correspondent of Haugen's and an active supporter of the con-
gressman's career. He frequently wrote to Haugen on private
stationery, informing him of the latest developments in appoint-
ments, position vacancies, RFD routes, and the like. According
to department custom, Haugen offered recommendations for
the reappointment of postmasters at third-class offices, many of
which managed their own RFD networks. When new routes
were established, Guttersen asked Haugen for his "wishes" as
to which carriers to appoint. When Haugen did not make any
recommendations, Guttersen selected "active" and "strong" Re-
publicans. Guttersen even campaigned informally for Haugen
in his visits to the Fifth District, reporting that "I made it a point
to tell everyone I saw that I had 189 applications from Iowa and
that yours were the first ones I took up because you were push-
ing them."""
In addition to Haugen, the agents maintained a broad net-
work of contacts in Iowa. Guttersen communicated frequently
with Willard Eaton, chair of the Iowa House Ways and Mear\s
Committee and one of the most powerful Republicans in the
state. Olson appears to have known a number of bankers in the
towns whose routes he had inspected. Like fourth-class post-
masters, bankers were central elites in rural locales, for they saw
virtually the entire population on a frequent and regular basis.
They also commanded prestige as country professionals and
rural businessmen. And both Guttersen and Olson met with
28. Guttersen and Olson were based in the Indianapolis office of the Western
Division of the Rural Free Delivery Service. See Guttersen to Haugen, 16 June
1900, on stationery of the Merchant's Hotel, Osage, Iowa, June 1900 file, box
120, Haugen Papers. For Guttersen's request for Haugen's backing on a deci-
sion to close a small post office and discontinue a star route, see Guttersen to
Haugen, 11 July 1900, ibid. On third-class appointments, see C. P. Grandfield
(First Assistant Postmaster General) to Haugen, 7 August 1908; and Grand-
field to Haugen, 21 August 1908, Calmar file, Haugen Papers. On Guttersen's
promotion of Haugen, see Guttersen to Haugen, 2 June 1900, box 120, Haugen
Papers. See also Guttersen to Haugen, 9 June and 28 May 1900, ibid.
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numerous farmers along the routes they irwpected and knew
many other notables in the towns they toured. In other counties
special agents were close associates of newspaper editors and
Republican county committee officials.^
As closely intertwined as the agents were with Haugen and
the communities in his district, their relationship consisted not
of capture, but of mutual dependence for information and po-
litical support. The agents ultimately answered not to Haugen
but to their department superiors: James Stuart in Chicago,
Chief Inspector M. D. Wheeler, and assistant postmasters gen-
eral such as Joseph L. Bristow, Peter V. DeGraw, and W. S. Shall-
enberger. In particular, speöal agents rejected many of Hauger\'s
requests for the establishment or alteration of routes. In 1900 the
towns of Calmar and Ossian in Winneshiek County petitioned
for routes. Haugen recommended both routes, as important no-
tables in both towns (including Calmar's banker) had written to
him for support. Olson inspected the two routes and wrote to
Machen recommending against their establishment, noting that
the proposed routes overlapped with a route established from
the Decorah post office. The department approved Olson's re-
port, marking the cases "adverse" and closing them. Machen's
rules constrained Guttersen as well. The postmaster at Osage
complained in 1900 that Guttersen had altered the town's route
so as to depart significantly from the one petitioned for. Gutter-
sen wrote with a firm rejection of the town's request for re-
mapping and a warning to cease protest.
29. My evidence here, while indirect, is reliable and consistent with other ob-
servations and archival materials. Eaton wrote to Haugen informing the con-
gressman of Guttersen's favorable report on a route application for Orchard,
Iowa. See Willard L. Eaton to Haugen, 21 February 1900, box 120, Haugen Pa-
pers. Olson filed his report on the Calmar and Ossian cases using the station-
ery of the National Bank of Decorah. Olson to Machen, 29 September 1900,
Haugen Papers. Ole P. Ode, the cashier for the Winneshiek National Bank,
knew Haugen well and later served on the Republican Central Committee of
Winneshiek County. !n a 1907 petition for the reappointment of Decorah post-
master J. J. Marsh, Decorah bank officials, including three cashiers, were the
first private officials listed in a petition of more than a thousand names.
Decorah file, Haugen Papers. Rural agent John T. Boylan was a coeditor of the
Eldora Herald and a friend of Charles Albrcx)k, president of the Hardin County
Republican Central Committee. See Fuller, "RFD in Hardin County," 1058.
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Mr. Haugen also kicks about this and wants me to have it changed
so as to satisfy you and some other friends he has on that north
road, this I cannot do and if you and Mr. Hougen [sic] knew what
our orders from the department were you would not ask me to do
it, for under the conditions that exist in this case you would not
then get a route, for the Department would see as I did that by
changing it, Dixie P.O. and star route would be discontinued and
that expence saved the department.^
The department's unencumbered authority to create and
terminate routes allowed it to compel cooperation from Haugen
and other legislators. When two letter carriers resigned from the
Decorah post office in February 1901, Machen wrote to Haugen
and asked that he suggest names for hiring. Haugen was per-
fectly eager to supply rmmes, but in case he was not. Machen
added a powerful incentive clause to the letter: "if a suitable
person carmot be secured to serve as rural carrier the route will
necessarily have to be abandoned." In 1905, Fourth Assistant
Postmaster General Peter V DeGraw chastised Haugen and
other rural congressmen for their tardiness in responding to
department requests for names for postmaster appointments.
Concerned that the delays in appointments were subjecting the
department to "embarrassment and criticism," DeGraw insti-
tuted a new system requiring recommendations within 60 days
30. Ole P. Ode, the cashier for the Winneshiek County Bank in Calmar, sub-
mitted Calmar's petition. Ode to Haugen, 18 July 1900. Machen acknowledged
the petitions in a retum letter to Haugen, 10 August 1900. Six weeks later,
Olson filed his report on private stationery (see above). Olson to Machen, 29
September 1900. All three letters in Calmar file, RFD Correspondence, Haugen
Papers. As an indicator of his status and that of other cashiers. Ode later
served on the Republican Central Committee for Winneshiek County (see
above). Two decades later, he served as president of Calmar's First State Bank.
See Sigvart T. Kittlesby to John H. Bartlett, First Assistant Postmaster General,
23 February 1928, ibid. For the decision on the Calmar and Ossian cases, see
Johnson to Haugen, 9 January 1901, ibid. (Department File "Rural-F-118-HAB").
Machen's initials appear at the top right comer of the letter. Two weeks later,
the department approved RFD for the Decorah post office, a second-class
office. Johnson to Haugen, 22 January 1901 (Department File "S-F-39-FH").
Calmar later became a third-class ("Presidential") office and received RFD. See
C. P Grandfield, First Assistant Postmaster General, to Haugen, 7 August 1908,
Calmar file. On the Osage route case, see Guttersen to Postmaster of Osage 7
July 1900, July 1900 file, RFD Correspondence, Haugen Papers.
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of a request; otherwise the department would exclude congress-
men from the selection process.^'
THE DEPARTMENT employed two criteria—partisanship and
literacy—in selecting which communifies got routes and which
did not. Postal officials used the first criterion ii\formally, the
second publicly. Partisanship was a salient factor separafing the
abundance of routes in northern districts from the dearth of
routes in the South. McKirüey and Roosevelt Republicans saw
immense political advantage in expanding routes to the satis-
facfion of the rural interior communities that had been essential
in the victories of 1896 and 1900. The stark differential was not
lost on congressional Democrats. One noticed that Kansas, "as
rock-ribbed and everlasting in her republicanism as South Caro-
lina in her democracy," had over a thousand more routes than
South Carolina." In response the department admitted the geo-
graphical differential but attributed it to the necessity of placing
routes where literacy and readership were high. Yet the force of
partisanship is undeniable. In an innovative analysis of the dis-
tribution of routes across districts, Samuel Kemell and Michael
McDonald show that the department allocated routes so as to
strengthen the congressional majority RepubUcar\s had won in
1894. Republican districts received more routes than Democratic
incumbents did, of course, but the effects depend critically upon
the electoral competifiveness of recent races. Republican incum-
bents in recently acquired districts received more than ten times
as many routes as Democratic incumbents in swing districts.^
Although scholars have doubted that the department truly
cared about literacy in its route allocations, variations in reader-
ship were a crucial factor in department decision making. Read-
ership meant consumption, and department officials desper-
ately needed to show profits to convince Congress to fund RFD
31. Machen to Haugen, 21 February 1901, Decorah file, Haugen Papers (De-
partment File "Rural-F-992-O"); DeGraw to Haugen, 7 July 1905, RFD Corre-
spondence, Haugen Papers.
32. Quoted in Fuller, RFD, 64.
33. Samuel Kemell and Michael McDonald, "Congress and America's Politicai
Development: The Transformation of the Post Office from Patronage to Ser-
vice," American Joumal of Political Science A3 (1999), 792-811.
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expansion. Accordingly, special agents such as Olson and Gut-
tersen repeatedly pointed to literacy in their investigations of
proposed routes. Olson denied Haugen's request for RFD at
Calmar because the proposed route would have left "two-thirds
of the most intelligent Citizens and patrons unserved." Olson
then approved service at Decorah because its post office was
"one of the very best in this part of the state, doing a very large
business for its size." Rural citizens knew of the department's
preferences for high literacy rates and incorporated them into
their petitions. Hardin County residents advertised their "dis-
tinguished honor of having the smallest per cent of illiteracy of
any coimty in the nation. It is the exception to find a home with-
out a newspaper and other valuable reading matter." Because
areas where income, readership, and literacy were high were
also areas that strongly supported Roosevelt Republicans, the
department's efforts to maximize RFD profitability also served
political ends.^
From an institutional perspective, of course, the central and
most neglected story of RFD concerns not route allocation but
the displacement of fourth-class post offices. With administra-
tive control of RFD after 1900, Machen proceeded to eliminate
the country postmaster. He secured Postmaster General Charles
Emory Smitíi's consent to issue a departmental regulation in
1901 requiring the closure of at least one fourth-class post office
in each community served by a new route. Aiming for efficiency
34. Olson to Machen, 29 September 1900, Calmar file, RFD Correspondence,
Haugen Papers; Fuller, "Rural Free Delivery in Hardin County," 1054. Kemell
and McDonald doubt the department's literacy-based rationales, but for
Washington officials who closely tracked revenue statistics, the relationship
between literacy and revenues was an ineluctable fact. City free delivery reve-
nues provided the best indication; revenues were sharply higher where pa-
trons were more literate. Revenues also increased with readership and income,
that is, precisely in those northern states where Republicans dominated after
1896. From 1896 to 1910, first- and second-dass offices in Iowa (where the illit-
eracy rate was 2.1 percent) had average per capita receipts of $3.37, whereas
offices in Texas (where the illiteracy rate was 14.25 percent) had per capita re-
œipts of $2.67 over the same period. A regression analysis of frrê delivery re-
ceipts in Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Texas from 1896 through 1910 revealed that
postal revenues in first- and second-class offices were positively related to the
county Republican vote (i-ratio = 22.58) and negatively related to the coimty
illiteracy rate (i-ratio = -6.134) (the minimum f-ratio for a finding of statistical
significance is ar\ absolute value of 1.96).
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and the undermining of nineteenth-century tradition, Machen's
officials targeted long-entrenched postmasters in small towns."
In some respects, the department's choices amounted to out-
right age discrimination. In December 1908 First Assistant Post-
master General C. P. Grandfield eliminated the post office at
Hustad because "the postmaster, who is about eighty years of
age, is unable to look after the office."^
The postmasters fought back with passion and tact. Even
where new routes did not snuff out their offices, RFD threat-
ened to bypass their role in mail distribution, reducing the num-
ber of through customers for their general supply stores and
limiting their influence in the local connmunity. The postmasters
joined with star route carriers in petitioning members of Con-
gress to pressure the department to delay or obstruct the intro-
duction of Rural Free Delivery in their localities. They also be-
friended the rural agents, persuading them to draw routes that
would originate with or intersect their offices, to preserve their
role in the new scheme of distribution.^
Wayne Fuller, the most thorough historian of the Rural Free
Delivery system, has argued that RFD resulted in less uniformity
and efficiency than national postal officials would have liked.
In his study of RFD operations in Hardin County, Iowa, Fuller
claims that Machen's efforts to dispose of fourth-class post of-
fices were largely ur\successful. Few post offices were elimi-
nated. Fuller argues, due largely to local capture of the special
agents and the resistance of fourth-class postmasters. The post-
masters "cajoled and argued and threatened," putting members
of Congress in the unhappy predicament of having to choose
between routes for their constituents and the livelihoods of
powerful local elites. Fuller concludes that the congressmen
35. For discussion of Smith's order, see his Annual Report, 1901, 11-12. Also
Fuller, "Rural Free Delivery in Hardin County," 1061. The department also
asked Haugen for information and gave him the chance to object.
36. Grandfield to Haugen, 22 December 1908, Haugen Papers.
37. Carroll County, Maryland, for instance, had 94 fourth-class postmasters
and dozens of star-route (horseback) mail carriers. They "vigorously de-
noxinced" Machen's experiment and "succeeded in creating in some quarters a
strong but temporary opposition to the service." See Machen's report, "Rural
Free Delivery in Carroll County, MD," 4;Fuller, RFD, 51-52, lOOff.
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were usually able to secure both. In Hardin County, he found
that only 3 of 42—or less than 10 percent—of fourth-class post
offices were terminated after the introduction of RFD.^
It is evident, however, that the department's efforts were far
more successful elsewhere in Iowa. Roy Atwood intimates as
much in his study of RFD's effects on communities in south-
eastern Iowa. Atwood reports "numerous accounts of post of-
fice closures in the small communities" in that area, as many as
207 fourth-class closures in 1909 alone."" Haugen's papers allow
even more precise estimates, as he kept a personal notebook of
all of the post offices in his district. Haugen's notes report every
change of postmaster, the population served by the office, its
services (such as money orders) and date and cause of any office
termination. Analyses of a six-county sample of these records
show that the rate of termination for fourth-class post offices
appears far higher than Fuller's study of Hardin County would
suggest. Of 132 post offices sampled from Haugen's district, 49
(or 37 percent) closed by 1908—a rate of termination five times
higher than Fuller observed in Hardin County. A separate sta-
tistical analysis shows that fourth-class post offices died more
quickly after 1901 precisely where their postmasters had longer
tenure.
The patterns of Haugen's district were replicated nationwide.
In the twelve years following Machen's report in 1900, the de-
partment eliminated almost 20,000 fourth-class post offices.
Nationally, the total number of post offices fell from 76,945 in
1901 to 58,729 in 1912. The immense popularity of Rural Free
Delivery made this process easier, of course. So too did the Re-
publican learungs of many rural carriers. Members of Congress
knew that in eliminating offices to make way for RFD, they
were trading one set of Republicar\s for another. The carriers'
civil service test was commorüy regarded as an easy one, so the
Republican leanings of many special agents gave the RFD the
appearance of a patronage system in the clothing of Progressive
efhaency.
38. Fuller, "Rural Free Delivery in Hardin County," 1049-72.
39. Atwood, "Routes of Rural Discontent," 269 and fril4.
40. See Kemell and McDonald, "Congress and America's Political Develop-
ment," fig. 1. Congressional Republicans were keenly aware of the immense
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Rural mail carriers took pride in their position. Elkader carrier I. S. Crane
had this photographic postcard made ca. 1910-1915 and signed it "YOUR
FAITHFUL MAIL-CARRIER." Photo courtesy SHSI.
Yet the popularity of RFD only goes so far to explain why
congressional Republicans were willing to sacrifice the fourth-
class postmaster. Kemeil and McDonald argue that "nearly
everybody" understood the necessity of office closure as RFD
expanded, but they offer no evidence. With the department's
deficit declirùng and Rural Free Delivery running a solid sur-
plus by 1905, posing no threat to the department's fiscal disci-
pline, it is not clear why congressional Republicans could not
have stemmed the bleeding of their old (and continued)
friends. Moreover, the opposition of the postmasters and star
route contractors was intense. Why did the fourth-class office
die such a quick death? No adequate explanation can ignore
the entrenched pattem of deference that prevailed between the
House Post Office Committee and the Post Office Department.
political value of the rural carriers. As VV. B. C. Brown, Republican congres-
sional nominee, wrote in a letter to Postmaster General Charles Emory Smith:
"We ask that the Rural Mail Carriers, who will daily penetrate every part of
this country, may be Republicans, each and every one." Brown and others to
Smith, 2 November 1901, County Rural Delivery Records, Jackson County,
Missouri, NA; quoted in Fuller, RFD, 59.
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While the committee constrained office elimination, its mem-
bers were more interested in which offices got axed than in
how many. Machen's officials could terminate more offices
than efficiency counseled simply because they were better
informed and broadly trusted. And when a member such as
Haugen opposed elimination of a particular post office, the
department often acquiesced to his interests by hiring more
carriers to cover the routes of the eliminated office. Carriers
were less costly than offices, yet were still politically valuable.
Most important, however, was Congress's growing institutional
trust in the department to run the system efficiently, a confi-
dence seated firmly in the House committee and its leaders
Eugene Loud, John Wadsworth, and John Weeks. The depart-
ment had invented RFD. It had issued and secured local com-
pliance with scores of regulations, rendering the system effi-
cient. And it had done all this without upsetting the Republican
majorities of 1896 and 1900. In addition, the long-criticized
postal deficit had begun, for the first time in a generation, to
disappear. For Congress to acquiesce to Machen's and other
officials' aim of winnowing the rariks of fourth-class post-
masters—to grant them lasting and relatively unencumbered
hold over the rural delivery system—^was in some respects a
reward for service rendered.
WITH THE STANDARDIZATION of city operations and the
overhaul of rural mail operafions, a new postal system emerged
in Iowa after the tum of the century. It was characterized less by
patronage than by policy, less by local autonomy than by in-
creasing regulation from Washington. Other historians—Wayne
Fuller and Roy Atwood, among them—^have documented the
cultural, political, and economic implications of these changes.
Yet the centralization campaign in Iowa post offices also reveals
a different, perhaps more troubling legacy: the eclipse of
women's managerial roles in postal admirûstration.
For all of its obvious faults, the old regime of patronage had
some peculiar and little noticed benefits for the families of Iowa
postmasters and for women. To begin with, in smaller (second-
to fourth-class) post offices, patronage often meant nepofism.
The postmaster (usually male) often hired his wife as assistant
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postmaster and his sons, daughters, cousins, nieces, and neph-
ews as clerks. Moreover, because the postmaster's job was not
seen as a full-time office occupation, tiie postmaster frequently
left management of the office to his family, most often his wife.
In Indianola, Anna Dowell was assistant postmaster to her hus-
band, E. B. Dowell. In Emmetsburg, Alizanah Appelman was
assistant postmaster to Frank S. Appelman, and Lena A. Gus-
land continued the local tradition of women's management by
taking over for Alizanah after the latter resigned in August 1900.
In this respect, nineteenth-century small-town post offices were
literally family operations. Some women, such as Susan C. Car-
penter of Fort Dodge (wife of former governor Cyrus Clay
Carpenter, who had served as postmaster at Fort Dodge from
1889 to 1893) even held the postmaster position itself. More gen-
erally, women occupied many of the more elevated administra-
tive roles in post offices before 1900, including superintendent
of money orders (Harriet J. Maish of Des Moines), money order
clerk (Ruberta and Loretta Brown of Des Moines), and registry
clerk (Mary E. Harrison of Davenport). Money order clerks and
registry clerks, while "clerks" in the literal sense, had far more
meaningful jobs than "stampers" and "general utility clerks."
Moreover, the greater breadth of their responsibilities was re-
fiected in higher pay Money order clerks earned $700 annually,
compared to $400 or $500 for stampers and general utilitv
clerks.*'
With increasing departmental control of hiring practices
after 1900, the managerial and administrative presence of women
in Iowa post offices began to give way to mundane clerkships.
In personnel rosters for first-, second-, and third-class post offices
in Iowa from the National Archives, it is possible to identify
68 women who worked at some time from 1890 to 1905. Of
these women, 37 were hired before 1900 and 31 were hired from
41. The information on women in post office employment is contained in em-
ployee and salary registers for first-, second-, and third-class offices in the Na-
tional Archives. See RG 28 (Post Office Department), E 78 (Salary Rosters for
Clerks in First-, Second- and Third-Class Offices), which also includes infor-
mation on office superintendents, assistant postmasters, and postmasters. I
have collected and maintain a full spreadsheet archive of all employees in the
rosters for 1890 to 1905 in Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
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TABLE 3
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WOMEN'S ROLES
IN IOWA POST OFFICES BEFORE AND AFTER 1900
Position (salary)
Postmaster ($1200-$1400)
Assistant Postmaster ($1000)
Superintendent of Money Orders
($800-$1000)
Money Order Clerk ($700-$800)
Registry Clerk ($600-$700)
Stampers ($300-$400)
Median women's salary upon hire
(nominal dollars)*^
Percentage of women hired as stampers
Number of women hired
Number of
women hired
to position
before 1900
1
0"
1
7
3
13"
$700
35%
37
Number of
women hired
to position
after 1900
0
5
0
2
1
21
$500
68%
31
SOURCE: Nafional Ani\ives personnel records of first-, second-, and third-class post
offices, 1890-1905, RG 28, E 78.
'Although no women were appointed as assistant postmaster before 1900, three of
the women appointed were later promoted to assistant postmaster.
"Seven of the thirteen stampers before 1900 were hired in 1898 and 1899.
The salary comparisons use nominal dollars. If real dollars are used, the statistics
show an even greater decline in women's salaries after 1900.
1900 to 1905. The 37 hired before 1900 illustrate the diversity of
positions women occupied in runeteenth-century Iowa. Four
women served as chief clerk of their post offices, seven as
money order clerk, one as postmaster, and only thirteen as
"stampers," the lowest-rarJdng clerical job of the post office. Of
the thirteen stampers, seven were hired in 1898 and 1899.
The Post Office Department's standardization and centrali-
zation movement brought lower-rank positions for Iowa women
(see table 3). Women were far less likely after 1900 than before to
be hired as money order derks or registry clerks. They were more
likely to be appointed as assistant postmasters, as it turns out,
but several of tíiose women soon resigned or were terminated
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^Nomen clerks sort mail under male supervision in the Strawberry Point
post office, 1911. Photo courtesy SHSI.
and, in either case, were replaced by men. The most dramatic
transformation of women's employment in Iowa post offices
after 1900 came in the standard job they occupied. Of the 37
women in this sample of Iowa offices before 1900, orüy 13 were
hired as stampers, the lowest rung in the administrative hier-
archy. By contrast, over two-thirds of all women hired from
1900 to 1905 in those offices, or 21 of 31, were hired as stampers.
The effect of moving women into mundane clerical work also
affected their livelihoods. Even without taking inflation into
account, the median salary for women hired in Iowa post offices
after 1900 dropped by two hundred dollars.
While the decline of women in managerial positions is stark,
it is not clear why women were hired in greater numbers as
stampers. As a broader current within Progressive society, of
course, the trend toward the "clericalization" of women's work
has been well documented. The expansion of managerial work
in the tum-of-century corporate workplace linked masculinity
with discretion- and power-laden jobs. As the division of labor
in the American economy widened, and as Victorian sodal mores
took greater hold, a clerical position was increasingly seen as "a
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position that God has not particularly assigned to men." The
American economy needed women as workers, but American
culture relegated them to positions without meaningful au-
thority. In this respect, the gender trends in Iowa post offices
echo a race-based division of labor in other areas of the Post
Office Department, especially the Railway Mail Service, where
white clerks staffed the moving mail trains while black clerks
worked in less glorious "terminal RPO" jobs in train stations.
In the early twentieth century postal "machine," "manly" labor
combined mental endeavor and physical exertion, and often
authority as well. Women were hired into clerical positions be-
cause such posts were increasingly seen as "natural" or "pre-
destined" for them, and as unfitting for men (especially white
men).
When women did become postmasters, it could stir contro-
versy. Jessie Teeling succeeded her father E. H. Teeling as post-
master of Charles City's second-dass post office in Floyd County
in 1897. Shortly thereafter, several citizens began to make noise,
argioing that, as a woman, Teeling was unfit for office and served
orüy because of her father's good name. L. H. Henry, a promi-
nent local businessman and Republican stalwart, campaigned
vigorously to replace Teeling at the end of her term in 1903. It
appears that Heruy actually began his campaign in 1899, fully
four years before Teeling's term ended. In July 1902, Henry
followed up on earlier correspondence with Gilbert Haugen,
Charles City's representative, and J. J. Howley, First Assistant
Postmaster General, complaining that Teeling was not deliver-
ing mail to his supporter J. Butterñeld. The department investi-
gated and found "satisfactory service." A diverse group of local
notables rallied in support of Teeling. They circulated a petition,
sent it to Haugen and the department, and wrote numerous
letters. Charles City attomey W S. Prouty reminded Haugen of
42. Carole Srole, "Feminization of Clerical Work." Because of expanding labor
demand, women did not move from the workplace to lives of pure domesticity.
See also Kenneth Lipartito, "When Women Were Switches: Technology, Work,
and Gender in the Telephone Industry, 1890-1920," American Historical Review
99 (1994), 1075-1111; Carpenter, "The Corporate Metaphor and Executive De-
partment Centralization in the United States." Throughout this period, women
were hired as carriers only if they were widows of U.S. soldiers or wives of
disabled veterans.
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the "growth of the business done at the [Charles City] office, the
accuracy and dispatch with which business is done and the
obliging manners of Miss Teeling and her employees under her
administration." Carl Merckel stated that Teeling had "kept the
P.O. here in a good, straight Business like manner" and reported
from his vantage as a "Maii\street" businessman that "less mis-
takes have been made since she [Teeling] has control of the P. O.
than by any incumbent gone before." Some of the letters for
Teeling were patronizing, as J. H. Parker wrote that his "object"
was "to shield a young girl from the attacks of a scheming poli-
tician who is working for selfish ends.""
Henry's proponents quickly fought back. H. J. Durkee's let-
ter to Haugen in January 1903 illustrates the gendered rhetoric
that Henry's followers used.
My Dear Haugen:—
As the crisis is approaching in the Charles City post office I
want to say a word or two in favor of the RIGHT MAN, who by all
laws of political warfare is justly entitled to the office. The hue and
cry raised . . . for a second term for the woman is nothing more
nor less than an effort to defeat L. H. Henry by enlisting the sym-
pathy of weak minded patrons of the office for the woman."
Later that year, Teeling was replaced by the very man who had
sought to evict her from office: L. H. Henry.*^
Statistics clearly document the gendered consequences of
postal reform in Iowa's first-, second-, and third-class post
offices, and Teeling's experience illustrates the gender dynamics
operating in communities with post offices of that size. For
communities with fourth-class post offices, however, the gender
picture is more complicated. Women continued to serve as
fourth-class postmasters, and it appears that the centralization
campaign did not materially reduce their hiring. From Elizabeth
43. Prouty to Haugen, 21 December 1900; Merckel to unknown recipient [pos-
sibly Howley], 20 October 1902; J. H. Parker (Northwood, IA) to Haugen, 28
July 1902, all in Charles City file, Haugen Papers.
44. H. J. Durkee (Nashua, IA) to Haugen, 29 January 1903, Haugen Papers,
Charles City file.
45. Appointment information from Haugen Post Office Scrapbook, Haugen
Papers. Gilbert Haugen's role in the replacement is not clear.
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Crowe, appointed "postmistress" at Fayette County's Clermont
office in June 1911, to Emma Nicolay, who managed the Post-
ville office in Allamakee County from 1915 into the 1920s, wom-
en commonly led fourth-class offices after 1900, more than fifty
women in Haugen's district alone.
Yet the demise of the fourth-class office illustrates all too
clearly how large-scale dynamics of postal change were reducing
opportunities for women. No matter how many small commu-
nities favored women as officeholders, the elimination of offices
in those communities was being pressed by "effidency"-minded
postal officials in Washington. Furthermore, the rural carriers
who replaced fourth-class postmasters were almost uniformly
male; in Cedar Rapids, not a single woman served as dty or
rural free delivery carrier in 1911.
What about postal centralization drove women into mun-
dane clerical positions? One possible explanation lies in the con-
servative Victorian morality of the leaders of the postal reform
movement in Washington. Anthony Comstock's traditionalist
(from a contemporary vantage, even sexist) views on women's
roles are now well known. It is also worth remembering that the
postal reform wing grew out of the Railway Mail Service, which
at the tum of the century laid claim to a highly irtsular and
fraternal identity. The railway mail clerks were all male and
looked down on post office work, and the service exhibited a
stark racial segregation. In short, the growth of a Progressive
"efficiency" movement in government administration did not
include gender or radal equality as core ideals."
IN THE DEVELOPMENT of American political institutions,
postal centralization was important less for its new instru-
mental effidencies than for increasing the presence of the na-
tional state in dtizens' lives. After 1900, Iowa post offices of
every class began to look more and more alike. They shared two
daily residential deliveries, rural free delivery service, and
46. On Comstock, see Nicola Beisel, Imperiled Innocents: Anthony Comstock and
Family Reproduction in Victorian America (Princeton, NJ: 1997). On the insular
racial identity of the Railway Mail Service, and its cormection to metaphors
used by RMS workers, see Carpenter, "The Corporate Metaphor and Executive
Department Centralization," 191-94.
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reduced costs. They received more and more visits from in-
spectors. They witnessed fewer women in positions of discre-
tion and authority All of those transformations depended on
the designs of postal officials in Washington and the increasing
trust they commanded from the House and Senate Post Office
Committees who allowed discretionary admirústration over the
postal system. For better or worse, postal centralization made
the Post Office Department a more integrated projection of the
American "state."

